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Abstract
We propose a stock-market-based measure to capture initial beliefs about an event’s effect
on firm profits, which may be used to measure whether initial expectations are subsequently
realized. Our “Event Long-Short Index” is the difference in market-capitalization-weighted
returns of firms that outperform versus underperform the market on the event date. We use
post-event index returns to measure whether initial beliefs are reinforced or attenuated. We
apply our approach to the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Brexit referendum to illustrate
the index and its interpretation and to validate it, showing that it moves as expected following
subsequent political and business news.
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1 Introduction
Stock markets have proven to be a useful testing ground for the expected business effects of a wide
range of phenomena, including natural disasters, covert CIA operations, and especially unexpected
political turnover.1
While these studies crisply capture investors’ contemporaneous expectations of an event’s im-
pact, the results of event studies also raise the question of the extent to which these expectations
are borne out in practice. In this paper, we propose a stock-market-based index which aims to
capture the extent to which initial expectations of the effects of an event are well-calibrated relative
to eventual outcomes. While the examples we examine below are surprise election results, the same
approach and similar interpretation could be applied to other unexpected events.
For a given event, we use the firms which outperform the market on the event date to form an
“Event Long Index” and similarly construct an “Event Short Index” comprised of underperforming
stocks. We weight stocks in these indices by the product of market capitalization and the absolute
value of their out/underperformance. The difference between the two – the Event Long-Short Index
– increases by construction on the event date. We take subsequent returns as a summary measure of
investors’ beliefs in the extent to which their expectations of changes anticipated on the event date
are likely to be realized in practice. Our summary statistic has the useful and intuitive property
that the ratio of the change in the index on date t to the change in the index at the event date is
equal to the coefficient from a (market capitalization-weighted) least squares regression of date-t
returns on event-date returns.
Conceiving of the the Event Long-Short Index in this way helps to highlight the circumstances
under which it serves as a useful barometer for changes in the anticipated impact of the event. As
is typical of event studies, our index yields cleaner results when there is little other relevant news
for stock returns on the event date. It is helpful in settings in which companies cannot easily be
sorted ex ante into likely winners and losers, as our approach allows stock prices to provide this
information. For the elections that will be our focus, if there are post-event shifts in the winning
politician or party’s desired policies, our index will capture their success to the extent that their new
goals are correlated (in terms of their impacts on firms) with the policies anticipated immediately
following the event. (In Section 2 we discuss in greater detail the settings that will be suited to our
methodology, as well as its limitations.)
We apply our methodology to two unanticipated political outcomes: the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, and the 2016 Brexit referendum.2 Focusing first on the 2016 election, while the market
1For an event study of earthquakes, see Shelor et al. [1992]; for CIA coups, see Dube et al. [2011]. Faccio [2006]
provides a multi-country perspective on investors’ responses to unexpected political turnover. For work focused
on the U.S., see, for example, Fisman et al. [2012], for an event study on expected political turnover induced by
Vice-President Richard Cheney’s heart attacks.
2We are not the first to study market reaction to the 2016 election, or elections broadly. Our innovation is in the
creation of a new tool for examining how investor beliefs about a set of policies evolve subsequent to an election. See
2
overall saw gains the day after the election (the trading day in which Trump’s victory became
apparent), this overall effect masked considerable heterogeneity in the cross-section of returns. For
example, for-profit universities, large banks, and coal companies experienced large gains, while
alternative energy stocks and hospitals declined. These patterns were, we argue, broadly reflective
of differences in the Trump versus Clinton campaign platforms. We show that our Trump Long-
Short Index moves in expected ways in the year following the election, if we are to interpret it as
a measure of Trump’s ability to enact his agenda: the index declined in the weeks following FBI
Director James Comey’s firing, then recovered after his Senate testimony, which failed to deliver
impeachment-worthy revelations. Our index declined again with the indictment of Trump campaign
manager Paul Manafort, and increased with the passage of the Senate tax bill, which may have
indicated that Trump’s agenda was back on track. We show that more standard measures of an
administration’s success – presidential approval ratings as well as the probability of early departure
or reelection based on Betfair wagers – move in the same direction as our index, but are less
responsive to some of the pivotal events in the Trump administration’s first year. Overall, we see
the analysis of the 2016 election and its aftermath as a validation of our methodology.
To demonstrate some of the features of our approach that may prove useful in future applications,
we provide several decompositions of the overall Trump Long-Short Index, which are informative
of the particular policy effects that were expected from a Trump administration. These allow
us to consider, for example, whether Trump’s policies were expected to have sector- versus firm-
specific effects, and the extent to which particular policies accounted for both initial and subsequent
movements in our index (e.g., by contructing tax-correlated and tax-ortogonal components).
In a second application, we construct a Brexit Long-Short Index based on the unexpected
“leave” vote in the Brexit referendum on June 23, 2016. While the mapping from post-referendum
news to the economic consequences of the Brexit vote is less clear than in the case of Trump’s
election, we argue that subsequent movements in the Brexit index are plausibly consistent with
its interpretation as a measure of Brexit’s impact. When “hard” Brexit proponent Boris Johnson
– who risked splitting the vote with fellow Leaver Michael Gove – dropped out of the leadership
race, the index increased. After Gove was eliminated, and expectations solidified that the next
prime minister would be Theresa May, a more moderate candidate, the index declined. Our Brexit
index reverted overall in the months following the leave vote, suggesting that investors initially
over-estimated the profit consequences of Brexit.
While our two case studies emphasize political applications, our methodology may potentially
be applied to any setting in which an unexpected event has possible consequences across a range of
businesses that may be difficult to sort ex ante on the basis of, say, geography or industry. Consider,
for example, the Fukushima earthquake in 2011, which damaged a nearby nuclear power plant and
Knight [2006] for an analysis of the impact of the 2000 U.S. presidential election on stock prices. For event studies
focused on the 2016 election, see Wagner et al. [2018a] and Massound and Zhou [2018].
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led to a two-day decline of nearly 16 percent in Tokyo’s Nikkei index. While it might be natural
to focus on companies operating near the quake’s epicenter, as Carvalho et al. [2016] observe, the
earthquake led to much wider reverberations via supply chain disruptions. And given the stock
market declines worldwide (especially in Asia), a Fukishima Long-Short Index might shed light on
expected versus realized profit consequences globally. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
present another possible setting, given the wide-ranging consequences, and related subsequent events
(invasion of Iraq; near-capture of Osama bin Laden) that investors might interpret as (in)validation
of beliefs in the immediate wake of the World Trade Center attack.
Our goal is to provide a relatively versatile tool for examining the consequences of unanticipated
events, political or otherwise. Prediction markets are perhaps the most natural comparator for our
methodology. We view our approach as providing information that is complementary to prediction
markets, which may not attract sufficient liquidity for some types of outcomes, like Trump’s reelec-
tion probability, which was too far in the future in the period immediately following his election,
or the rules governing trade in financial services under Brexit, which is too technical to interest
bettors.3
2 Index Construction and Properties
We begin by defining an intuitive index which captures the distribution of benefits and costs as
a result of an unexpected event. Given our applications, we will frame the exposition in terms of
an unanticipated election outcome (though as emphasized in the introduction we view potential
applications to be somewhat broader).
Specifically, on event date e, let the returns of firm i be denoted by Rei , which we assume reflects
the change in firm value as a result of changes in expected policy at date e. We further denote
average returns on date e, weighted by market capitalization, by Re. For ease of exposition, we
treat as two separate groups the firms that beat the market at date e (expected beneficiaries) and
those that lag the market (expected losers), and use these two groups to construct an Election Long
Index and an Election Short Index respectively. In each case, we give proportionately more weight
to firms with higher anticipated benefits or costs, and further weight these returns by pre-event
market capitalization MV ei . Thus, each firm is assigned a weight in its portfiolio of:
wi = MV
e
i (R
e
i −Re). (1)
These weights collectively sum to zero, so the positive and negative weights can each be rescaled to
sum to one. Let L be the set of firms in the long index and S be the set of firms in the short index.
3See Snowberg et al. [2007] for the application of prediction markets to U.S. presidential elections, Wolfers and
Zitzewitz [2018] for a prediction market-based analysis of aggregate market effects of the 2016 election, and Wolfers
and Zitzewitz [2004] for a discussion of prediction markets applications more generally
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We set the index equal to 100 at date e− 1, and let it change according to subsequent returns, so
that the long index at date T is given by:
ETL = 100
∑
i∈L
wi
T∏
t=e
(1 + (Rti −Rt)) (2)
where Rti and Rt are firm i and (market cap weighted) mean returns on date t respectively. We
similarly define the short index ETS . Our summary measure of the extent to which investors at date
T continue to anticipate implementation of profit-relevant policies expected at date e is given by
our Election Long-Short Index, which is simply ELS = EL − ES .
Our index captures the intuition that, if investors’ beliefs about the incidence of benefits and
costs anticipated as a result of the election are maintained, the index should remain high. If ini-
tial uncertainty about policies’ implementation is resolved favorably, our index should appreciate
further, while the index should decline if expected policies fail to materialize or fall short of expec-
tations.4
The index allows us to follow the extent to which investors believe that profit-relevant policies
are on track. It also has the intuitive property that the ratio of the change in the index at date T
and the change in the index at date e is given by the coefficient from a regression of date-T returns
on date-e returns, weighted by market value, since
∆ETLS
∆EeLS
=
∑
i∈{S,L} wi(R
T
i −RT )∑
i∈{S,L} wi(R
e
i −Re)
=
∑
i∈{S,L}MVi(R
e
i −Re)(RTi −RT )∑
i∈{S,L}MVi(R
e
i −Re)(Rei −Re)
We can thus think of the change in the index at time T as reflecting whether beliefs moves toward
or against initial expectations. The size of the coefficient reflects the fraction of initial beliefs that
are reversed (or augmented) at date T .
A few caveats are in order for the application and interpretation of the index. Most importantly,
the weights in the long-short index (including whether a firm is assigned to the long index or the
short index) will capture beliefs about changed policy expectations at date e measured with noise.
The signal-to-noise ratio is a function of (a) the extent that beliefs about policies are affected at e;
(b) whether policy changes will have a substantial effect on firm valuation; and (c) whether other
relevant information appears on date e. Increasing the first two will improve the signal value of
the index, whereas the third will reduce it. Assuming no short-run changes in expected policies,
(a) and (b) are largely a function of the unexpectedness of the election outcome as well as the
differences in platforms between candidates. For the 2016 U.S. presidential election, for example,
we can expect the index will perform relatively well, given the unexpected outcome, and the stark
4Note that our index captures changes in the beliefs implicit in stock returns, without regard for the rationality
of the beliefs or the efficiency with which the market reflects them. If markets initially underreact or overreact to an
event, our index will reflect subsequent appreciation or depreciation, respectively.
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differences in policy platforms on issues ranging from tax policy to regulation. Movements in the
index lend themselves to several interpretations: they reflect the combined effect of success in
implementing anticipated policy objectives as well as shifts in policy objectives after the event date
e. In the example of the U.S. presidential election, our index may be best-suited to interpreting
index changes through the lens of efficacy in implementation rather than policy shifts, given that
the administration stayed true to the Trump campaign’s focus on slimming regulations, cutting
taxes, repealing the Affordable Care Act, and sabre rattling on trade.
The multiplicity of effects that were expected as a result of Trump’s election also highlights the
circumstances in which our measure may be particularly useful – if his administration was expected
to focus its reform efforts on a single industry or issue, one could simply assess policy successes and
failures by focusing directly on the affected firms (e.g., if banking reform were the expected focus
one could look directly at financial industry returns). Our approach is useful when the effects of
an election are expected to be multi-faceted and, more broadly, when the researcher has no direct
proxies to classify firms as expected winners and losers, as our approach does this indirectly via
stock returns.
The interpretation of our index as a regression coefficient naturally suggests possible extensions.
For example, just as the variation in stock returns on date e can be decomposed into its within-
industry and between-industry components, we can construct within-industry and between-industry
versions of our index. The within-industry index will maintain the same industry mix in L and S and
take positions in firms that out/underperfomed their industry on date e, while the between-industry
index takes positions in industries that outperformed the overall market. In the same way that a
overall regression coefficient is a weighted average of within- and between-regression coefficients,
the performance of our overall index reflects a weighted average of its within- and between-industry
components. Other decompositions of date-e stock returns, and thus of our index, are possible,
such as into components that are correlated with or orthognal to, for example, corporate tax rates
or other variables correlated with date-e returns.
Finally, the regression interpretation also gives us guidance for statistical inference. Given that
the date-T return on our index is proportional to a cross-sectional regression coefficient of date-T
returns on date-e returns, standard errors for the index return can be calculated using standard
techniques.
3 Applications
3.1 2016 Presidential Election
The data for our Trump Long-Short Index come from the North American version of the Compustat
Security Daily files. We include only common stocks whose primary market is in the United States.
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To classify firms into industries we use the GICS codes available in the Compustat data. We extract
from Compustat information on firms’ cash tax payments and income in order to calculate tax rates
according to the definition in Wagner et al. [2018a].
We present the Trump Long-Short Index in Figure 1. Recall that, by construction, the index
goes up on November 9, the date investors incorporated the election outcome into market prices.
The magnitude of the first-day rise reflects the high cross-sectional variance in individual stock
returns – the variance in individual returns on November 9 was six times higher than its average
during October 1 - November 8.5 The index rose again on November 10 and stayed high – at about
115 – through the first part of 2017, before starting to decline in mid-March.6
Some of the index’s movements coincide with eventful periods for the Trump Administration,
which we have shaded in the figure. Some of these highlighted events primarily involve shocks to
Trump’s expected political longevity (e.g., the firing and testimony of FBI Director Comey, and
the indictment of Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort), while others involve news about the
passage of, or failure to pass, new policies (e.g., ACA repeal and tax cuts).
Focusing first on key legislative efforts during the administration’s first year, the index fell
between the introduction of the American Health Care Act (AHCA), which would have repealed
the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and its subsequent failure to pass in the House of Representatives
(on March 7 and 24, respectively). The index increased slightly when the U.S. Senate voted 51-50
to open debate on ACA repeal on July 25 and fell when repeal failed to pass (51-49) on July 28.
The index also increased sharply in the week leading up to the passage of the Senate’s tax reform
bill in late November 2017, showing that the index responds to policy outcomes that may have
been of concern to investors at the time of the election. The size of the increase – 45 percent of
the November 9, 2016 gain – indicates that a sizeable fraction of the post-election rally was in
anticipation of tax cuts. We also label a pair of events that speak to investors’ possible uncertainty
about the administration’s longevity and/or its political capital to act on its policy goals. The first,
labeled “Comey,” begins with the firing of James Comey on May 9, which led to a sharp decline in the
index over the following weeks, amidst speculation that Comey would provide damning information
on Trump when he appeared before the Senate. More than a third of the index’s initial gains
were lost during this period, indicating a substantial decline in beliefs that Trump could execute
his agenda. The index then recovered on June 8, when the testimony failed to produce damaging
evidence. Finally, we observe a sharp decline in the index with the indictment of Trump campaign
manager Paul Manafort on October 30, 2017.
5Relative to the political events studied by Cutler et al. [1989], this suggests that investors put more weight on
the 2016 election than political shifts that took place in prior decades.
6Broadly consistent with the patterns we observe in Figure 1, Wagner et al. [2018b] find that stock returns
continued increasing on November 10 and 11, then reverted somewhat on November 14 and 15 (the next two trading
days after November 11). They thus conclude that the stock market required as much as 5 days to fully process
Trump’s election. We construct a version of our index that is weighted using returns from November 9 – 15 rather
than November 9 and obtain nearly identical results.
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For comparison, in Appendix Figure A1 we show the probabilities of Trump’s reelection and
survival through the end of calendar year 2019 (from the Betfair.com prediction market, where
individuals could place wagers on political events), as well as his approval rating (as aggregated by
fivethirtyeight.com, a political statistics website), shading the same set of events. In many cases,
these more traditional measures of presidential success move in the same direction as our index,
though often the effects are more muted.
To better understand the sources of these movements in our index, we present summary statis-
tics in Table 1 for the firms in the Long and Short portfolios of the Trump index. The sector
shares of the Long and Short portfolios reflect stated positions of the Trump campaign (relative
to Clinton’s). The Long portfolio is heavily weighted toward pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and
financials, reflecting expectations of deregulation. The Long portfolio is also weighted toward In-
dustrials whereas the Short portfolio includes a high proportion of information technology firms,
perhaps reflecting the Trump campaign’s promises of promoting domestic manufacturing. The
sector-wide distribution also masks some interesting within-sector variation. For example, while
the Long portfolio is overweighted toward energy at the sector-level overall, coal is entirely con-
tained in the Long portfolio, while renewable electricity is entirely in the Short portfolio.
Various characteristics of the two portfolios also line up with popular narratives of the winners
and losers under Trump policies, and also some of the findings in Wagner et al. [2018a]: Long
portfolio firms paid cash tax rates that were 7 percent higher than Short portfolio firms, consistent
with investor expectations of tax cuts. Small-cap stocks also tended to outperform large-caps on
November 9, as indicated by the much lower median market capitalization of the Long portfolio;
value stocks and previously low-performing stocks also did well, as suggested by the higher book-
to-market and lower prior returns in the Long portfolio.
One feature of our approach is that we may generate decompositions of the index, which may
provide additional insights on particular expected consequences of an event. For our Trump Long-
Short Index, we focus on within- versus between-industry effects, and effects driven by anticipated
tax reform versus those orthogonal to taxes. In Figure 2, Panel A, we decompose our index into
within and between-industry components, using GICS subindustries as the level of aggregation
(there are 164 subindustries in our sample). The between index reflects the performance of indus-
tries that outperformed or underperformed the overall market when Trump was elected, while the
within index reflects the subsequent performance of firms that outperformed or underperformed
their industries. Some of the between-industry gains can readily be tied to the performance of par-
ticular sectors or subindustries. Financial stocks, the largest component in the long portfolio, track
the overall index, for example waxing and waning with Trump’s fortunes during the Comey and
Manafort events.7 The within-industry index, by contrast, exhibits a steady reversion of its post-
7We refer the interested reader to Fisman and Zitzewitz [2017] or Wagner et al. [2018a] for further discussion of
industry-level patterns.
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election gain. We can offer some speculative explanations for the within-industry pattern. First,
many of big gains on November 9 were tied to expectations of infrastructure spending, which has
yet to materialize. The anticipated beneficiaries were spread across a range of industries, including
chemicals, construction equipment, and construction management companies, many of which have
given up their (relative) gains. Even more speculatively, the reversion may reflect that it has proven
more challenging than investors anticipated to assist (or remove assistance from) narrowly targeted
groups of firms, rather than entire industries.8
The signature legislative achievement of the Trump administration at the time of writing was
the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, satisfying Republican supporters’ expectations
of a corporate tax cut. In Panel B, we thus we decompose our overall index into components that
are orthogonal to and correlated with firms’ cash tax rates.9 As shown in Wagner et al. [2018a],
firms with high tax rates outperformed the market when Trump was elected. It is understandable
(and indeed reassuring for our methodology) that high tax firms also outperformed during the week
when it became clear that the Senate would pass the corporate tax cut (a pattern also documented
in Wagner et al. [2018c]); this is reflected in the sharp jump in the correlated index. The orthogonal
index also appreciates that week, likely reflecting both imperfections in our proxy for which firms
benefit from the tax bill and the increased expectation for other Trump-supported policy changes as
a result of the bill’s passage. Earlier events are accompanied by larger movements in the orthogonal
index; while changes in the tax-correlated index are far more muted, they are generally of the same
sign as the tax-orthogonal index.
Our primary interest in looking at the 2016 election is as a validation exercise for our methodol-
ogy – there are cleanly identifiable and largely unanticipated events that can credibly be associated
with the successes, failures, and likely longevity of the Trump administration. If our index captures
these changes, we should see it move in expected directions around these events. Table 2 presents
estimates of changes in our index (and its decompositions), with associated standard errors for a
set of post-election event periods. We estimate these changes in panel regressions of the following
form:
Rti −Rt = γt +
∑
E
∑
t∈E
βE(R
e
i −Re) + eti
where βE captures the average daily return of our index during event window E (divided by its
return on November 9) and γt is a date fixed effect. We multiply these estimates by the November 9
index return and the length of each event window to obtain (noncompounded) index returns during
8One widely-reported case was that of biofuels, which Trump advisor (and biofuels investor) Carl Icahn had
advocated – ultimately unsuccessfully – for deregulation. The administration similarly allowed preexisting subsidies
to remain in place, leading, for example, to reversion in valuations of fertilizer, solar, and wind producers.
9The cash tax rate is the ratio of taxes paid to net income before tax. We follow Wagner et al. [2018a] in focusing
on this measure of a firm’s tax rate, but the results are similar if we use accrued tax liability in the numerator. The
tax-correlated index replaces November 9 returns with the predicted values from a market-capitalization-weighted
regression of these returns on cash tax rates; the tax-orthogonal index uses the residuals from the same regression.
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each window. We calculate standard errors that allow for two-dimensional clustering by date and by
the 26 GICS industry groups represented in the sample. We provide these estimates for each event
window shaded in Figure 1, as well as for the first and second half of our sample period (the halfway
point happens to be June 7, the day before FBI director Comey’s testimony). The events that we
judged ex ante to involve increases in the likelihood of Trump’s agenda being implemented (Events
3, 4, and 7) were accompanied by increases in our indices, while the others were accompanied by
decreases. While the tax-correlated index had, as expected, strong gains when the Senate passed
its 2017 tax cuts, it also moved consistently with the overall index during the event windows related
to health care (Events 1, 4, and 5), as well as during events that were primarily about the longevity
of the Trump administration (Events 2, 3, and 6). During the shorter event windows, for most of
the index changes, we can reject that they are equal to zero at least at the 5 percent level.10 Below
the 7 individual events, we summarize the index movements during our seven event windows by
presenting estimates of the difference between those accompanying the events that were positive (3,
4, and 7) and negative (1, 2, 5, and 6) for Trump’s agenda. The positive and significant coefficient
estimates in this row indicate that all 5 indices moved consistently with our a priori expectations.
Overall, we take our results on post-event market movements during these key events as indicating
that our index captures investors’ policy expectations, and that subsequent shifts reflect changes
in these expectations.
At the bottom of Table 2, we show the changes in our indices, and associated standard errors,
for the first and second halves of our sample. If we view the first part of Table 2 as a validation
exercise, these long window comparisons may be seen as an application of the index to understand
the overall state of Trump’s agenda during the first part of his administration. We begin the first
half on November 10, after a second positive day for our index, and break the sample before Comey’s
testimony, when concerns about Trump’s longevity were heightened. For our overall index, we find
statistically significant evidence that the first seven-month period was a poor one for President
Trump; the components of the index each declined over the first half of the sample, though overall
these effects are imprecisely measured. With the exception of the within-industry index, our indices
recovered somewhat in the second half of our sample period, which began with Comey’s testimony
and ended with the passage of the tax cuts, but these recoveries were not statistically significant at
conventional thresholds. Overall, the first-half decline and second-half recovery are large relative to
our index’s initial movement, yet are not consistently statistically significant. We take two lessons
from this exercise. First, it illustrates the application of our method to explore thow the effects
of an event unfold over time relative to initial expectations, potentially in the absence of discrete
unexpected changes that allow for crisp event study analyses. It also illustrates the diminishing
precision with which our index is likely to measure policy implementation with the passage of time,
10Our results are similar if we use unweighted returns for our index and also for subsequent returns, so long as we
exclude micro caps (the bottom quintile of firms by market capitalization using NYSE breakpoints).
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as other factors come to influence stock prices.
Finally, we turn to examining how the returns of our overall index are affected if we control
for the performance of the overall market and for the performance of other commonly used asset
pricing factors. In a typical event study of a single firm, the performance of the market and other
factors is usually assumed to be unaffected by the event in question, and the primary focus is
on the stock’s “alpha” (its return beyond what would be expected given factor returns). In our
setting though, it is reasonable to expect the market and other factors to be affected by Trump’s
election and subsequent political news. Thus, the inclusion of factor controls can be viewed as
providing another decomposition of our index returns, into returns that can be explained (and left
unexplained) by firm characteristics such as market beta, size, and value.
Appendix Table A1 reports betas for the most commonly used asset pricing models – the CAPM
and the three and five-factor Fama-French models, with and without momentum. Our Trump index
has a positive CAPM beta of 0.43, reflecting the fact that higher beta stocks outperformed following
Trump’s election. Our index also has a positive loading on the SMB and HML factors and a negative
correlation with momentum, consistent with the portfolio characteristics reported in Table 1. In
Appendix Table A2, we repeat our event-window returns for our overall index from Table 2, and
then introduce controls for various asset pricing factors. U.S. equities performed well during our
sample period, and if we control for the positive CAPM beta of our index, its reversion during
the first half of our sample is even stronger. In our shorter event windows, accounting for market
returns and the relative performance of small-cap stocks has only a small impact on the estimated
event returns. Including the value factor substantially reduces the estimated event returns for most
event windows, as well as the standard errors for these estimates. As noted above, this is because
the stocks that Trump was expected to help tended to have high book-to-market values. Overall, we
conclude that the patterns in our main index partly reflect the expectation that Trump’s election
would help value stocks, and partly reflect expectations, and revisions thereof, that are independent
of the value factor.
3.2 The Brexit Referendum
As a second application, we create the Brexit Long-Short Index for the June 23, 2016 British
referendum on leaving the European Union. As with Trump’s victory, the Brexit “leave” vote was
largely unanticipated by the markets, and only became apparent long after the end of the European
trading day. We therefore use returns from June 24, 2016, the day after the referendum, to construct
our index. We use return data from the Global version of the Compustat Security Daily files and
include common stocks of firms whose primary market and headquarters are both in Europe (i.e., in
a member country of the European Union, European Economic Area, or Switzerland). Returns are
converted to a common currency using daily exchange rates from the Federal Reserve (publication
11
H.10).11
We present the Brexit Long-Short Index in Figure 3, which rises (again by construction) on the
first day that index returns are calculated. The index continued to rise in the days that followed,
with a sharp increase coinciding with the exit of “hard” Brexiteer Boris Johnson from the leadership
race. Johnson had risked splitting the vote with fellow Leaver, Michael Gove, so the departure may
have raised expectations of a hard-line Brexit prime minister. The index’s subsequent reversion
coincides roughly with the shift toward (and ultimate selection of) Theresa May – a candidate
with, at minimum, more moderate views on the E.U. – as successor to Cameron. The index
subsequently declined, returning to its pre-referendum level by late 2016, plausibly reflecting a
range of factors: investors had apparently shrugged off the consequences of Brexit, at least for large,
publicly traded firms; there remained uncertainty over its implementation (for example, whether
the British parliament would approve the use of Article 50, as required in order to withdraw from
the E.U.); and other world events, most notably the U.S. presidential election, also had a substantial
effect on market prices.
In Appendix Table A3, we report summary statistics for the Brexit Long and Brexit Short
portfolios. The Short portfolio, containing stocks expected to suffer greater harm under Brexit, is
disproportionately comprised of UK stocks, as well as stocks in financial and consumer discretionary
industries. The Long portfolio is comprised of a disportionately high share of stocks in other
countries that might be expected to benefited from Brexit. Figure 3 also reports a UK-only version
of our index, and Appendix Figure 2 we presents a within versus between industry decomposition
of our Europe-wide index. The patterns are very similar for each, though with a smaller initial gain
and less subsequent reversion for the within-industry index.
In contrast to the 2016 U.S. election, with Brexit, we feel less comfortable identifying short
event windows for which we had strong ex ante priors about the sign of changes in expectations
about the effects of Brexit, since there were many elements to the discussion in the weeks following
the “leave” vote. Nevertheless, we find the index movements in the weeks following the referendum,
as well as the significant reversion by the end of 2016, consistent with our understanding of the
evolution of beliefs about the business consequences of Brexit. This second application thus also
serves as an illustration of our method’s utility in tracking the evolution of investors’ beliefs about
Brexit’s business consequences.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we provide a new stock-market-based measure of revisions to initial expectations of
the effects of an event. When applied to elections, this measure largely tracks changes to expected
government policy through their impact on firm’s stock prices.
11The choice of common currency does not affect the results.
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Our Trump and Brexit Indexes potentially add to what we can learn from alternative metrics.
Existing prediction markets capture a limited set of outcomes and are often illiquid for events that
are far in the future (e.g., reelection), too esoteric for many bettors (e.g., Article 50), or too complex
to capture in a security (e.g, ACA repeal, the terms of Brexit). Voter opinion can be readily polled,
but its relevance for policy is often at a minimum immediately after elections, when victorious
politicians have flexibility in interpreting their mandate. In contrast, our approach works best in
the period immediately following a surprise event – political or otherwise – potentially providing a
useful complementary tool for understanding the ultimate effects of events on firms and the economy.
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